Memo · November 2026

Courts tolerate ex parte orders only with four safeguards.

The useful authority is not a line of cases striking protective-order statutes. It is a line, on four continents, that upholds ex parte relief only when four conditions are present, and that strikes the order or the statute when one is missing. The four: a verified, specific predicate of imminent harm; a fixed short duration; a prompt evidentiary hearing between the parties; and applicant candor with a real remedy for its breach.

Where a safeguard was missing, courts struck the order or the statute: DK v Crowley (Ireland), Blazel as applied (Wisconsin federal court), R v R [2014] EWFC 48, Crawford v. Ally (New York 2021). Where the safeguards were present, they upheld it: Baril (Manitoba), Omar (South Africa 2005), Kampf (Michigan 1999), Ness (Minnesota 2013). In Iowa the winning theory has been statutory. The chapter 236 assault predicate and the chapter 664A conviction predicate have produced reversals. No Iowa court has held § 236.4, the preponderance standard, or § 664A.3 unconstitutional.

The vocabulary, from three U.S. Supreme Court cases

No U.S. Supreme Court case decides a domestic-abuse protective order on due-process grounds. Mathews v. Eldridge supplies the three-factor balance. Fuentes v. Shevin reserves ex parte seizure for truly unusual situations. Connecticut v. Doehr is the closest analog: a judge attached a home ex parte on a one-sided affidavit about a fight, the claim was fact-dependent, there was no exigency and no bond, and a later damages action did not cure the loss. Every element maps onto a § 236.4 order that excludes a respondent from home on a verified petition. Santosky requires clear and convincing evidence before parental rights are terminated, which is the engine of Stary v. Ethridge and not of an ordinary one-year order. Rahimi is adverse on the Second Amendment and useful on the reasoning: disarmament was upheld because it was temporary, followed a judicial credible-threat finding, and came with notice and a chance to be heard.

Ex parte home exclusion

Blazel v. Bradley remains the U.S. decision that invalidated an ex parte domestic-abuse exclusion as applied, and only when no imminent danger was alleged. The court saved the statute by reading in a verified petition, specific imminent harm, judicial review, and a prompt hearing. Crawford requires a prompt evidentiary hearing when an arraignment order evicts the defendant. Fernando A. puts the burden on the State to prove a criminal order must continue. C.O. v. M.M. converts "a hearing" into a hearing with witnesses. Massachusetts guidance caps ex parte orders at ten court days absent proof of notice.

The strongest case the other way is Baker v. Baker (Minnesota 1992, secondary): a short ex parte home exclusion is a band-aid the Domestic Abuse Act allows, and temporary custody may rest on safety. Kampf and Schramek uphold ex parte issuance when an exigency affidavit and a hearing within days are built in. King v. King (Iowa Court of Appeals 2019) affirmed exclusive possession and firearm surrender in a final order. It did not decide § 236.4.

Preponderance, except one parent-child case in Texas

Stary v. Ethridge (Texas, May 2, 2025) is the only state high-court decision raising the standard. An order barring all parent-child contact for more than two years needs clear and convincing evidence and a best-interest finding. The mandate issued June 13, 2025. The reach is that order, not a one-year civil order and not a five-year criminal order without children. Crespo (New Jersey 2010, secondary) is the strongest adverse authority: preponderance is constitutional, there is no jury right, and post-order firearm seizure is constitutional. Iowa's standard is statutory preponderance. For a criminal extension, Vance places the burden on the defendant to prove he no longer poses a threat.

Mandatory arraignment orders

Iowa's magistrate "shall" enter a § 664A.3 order on probable cause plus a safety finding. The protected person cannot drop it. No court located for this memo has struck that kind of provision on its face. Wiederien (2006, 4–3) forbids extension after acquittal and is the due-process doubt; it construed § 708.12(2), the predecessor of chapter 664A. Rasmussen (7 N.W.3d 357) voids an order in a dismissed case and requires a conviction for five years. Ness is adverse authority: it rejected a facial attack even after the trial judge called the process pro forma. Howsare upheld holding the arrestee until that first appearance. State v. Hall (Iowa, May 22, 2026, unanimous) now holds that "the only condition precedent in section 664A.5 is a conviction, deferred judgment, [or] guilty plea" and that the court "is not required to consider additional proof, make additional findings, or offer additional explanations"; due process "is usually satisfied by notice and opportunity to be heard" at sentencing. It adopts State v. Hunter (Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2026, Buller J. concurring dubitante) and State v. Lynch (Ct. App. June 16, 2021); State v. Toler Sr. (Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2026) applied the same rule to a five-year order against an infant son. After Hall, a findings requirement for the five-year order can only come from the Legislature.

Mootness

Most courts treat reputation and legal disabilities as collateral consequences. Putman, Hawaii, Maine, and Massachusetts keep the appeal. Iowa does not. O'Brien v. Young (Iowa Court of Appeals, December 17, 2025) states the rule: an appeal from an expired chapter 236 order is moot; relationship and mental-health harms were "pure conjecture"; court costs are not a collateral consequence; no presumption of collateral consequences attaches to chapter 236 orders (n.1); expedited briefing was available and not requested. Flores v. Aragon Nunez (same day) reached the same result and said neither Iowa appellate court has presumed collateral consequences for chapter 236 orders. McGuire v. McGuire (January 10, 2024), Henson v. Fitzgerald (December 7, 2022), and R.M. v. D.S. (2023) are the same line. T.F. v. C.G. (February 5, 2025) is the exception: it reached the merits of an expired order "in an abundance of caution" while calling expired-order dismissals "a recurring problem." Cyran (Ohio, 6–1) is the high-court version of the rule, with a dissent that a custody statute making domestic-violence history a factor brands the respondent. The practice is to move for expedited submission at filing and to build a record of concrete legal consequences. Whether further review of O'Brien was sought or granted is not determined. The courts have declined to supply a non-mootness rule; section 1 of the cheapest lever is that rule.

Contempt, willfulness, and Iowa jailing the petitioner

Ary (a dissolution-decree contempt case) requires willful disobedience beyond a reasonable doubt. An indefinite order, or compliance that is impossible, defeats willfulness. Conrad affirmed dismissal under competing chapter 236 orders. Vance treated a self-reported coincidental encounter as compliance. Section 664A.7 states no mental state of its own; willfulness is judge-made, and the seven-day minimum is statutory. Massachusetts and England put accident and knowledge in the prosecutor's case. Labinski shows how thin a call can be and still count. Review in Iowa is certiorari for substantial evidence, so the willfulness fight is won or lost at the hearing.

Every jurisdiction this memo surveyed rejects the protected person's invitation as a defense for the respondent. Henley (Iowa 1995) is the Iowa outlier: the protected party in a criminal domestic-abuse case was held in contempt, seven days suspended, for aiding and abetting the defendant's violation of the order protecting her, following Hutcheson v. Iowa District Court, 480 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 1992). "The victim's permission and participation is no defense to a violation of a no-contact order, but such proof may be considered in determining whether a defendant acted willfully." The Iowa petition-form warning says the same. For a respondent, Henley is leverage on willfulness and credibility. It is not a license to accept an invitation.

The assault predicate

Chapter 236 defines domestic abuse as an assault under § 708.1. Runyan reversed a "credible threat" finding because messages without location lack immediacy and apparent ability. A mere threat, without more, is not necessarily an assault. The order was entered 19 days after a dissolution filing. Owens: fear alone is not a chapter 236 claim. Ewoldt: reaching for a child at a custody exchange is not an assault. G.B. and Budweg show the line still produces dismissals. On the criminal side, Petro (981 N.W.2d 686) terminated an extension after more than ten compliant years, and said compliance alone does not foreclose extension when the original conduct was violent. Goldston is the adverse Iowa case: de novo review still defers to credibility, and a pending dissolution does not erase a believed assault.

No appellate court in this survey reversed an order because it was tactical. Courts reverse because the predicate failed. The tactical context shows up in the facts. False-allegation sanctions that do exist are custody sanctions with findings, such as Peters v. Pennington, or perjury, as in Vileta. Omar is the answer to a facial attack: the potential to exploit a statute does not make the statute unconstitutional.

Remedies

Chapter 236 fees run against the defendant. Kraus (Iowa, December 12, 2025) affirmed a $7,226.65 Rule 1.413 sanction for a custody filing and reversed a dismissal that had treated the rule as a basis to throw the case out. Charles v. Charles (Appellate Court of Maryland, May 30, 2025) shows an abuse-of-process suit against a tactical temporary order can fail and generate a fee award against the person who was restrained: the husband filed for limited divorce in the morning, the wife petitioned for a protective order that evening and took the home by temporary order. Austria's barring-order regime pays compensation to a successful appellant. Iowa has no equivalent. Doehr is the constitutional hook for the missing bond.

Mutual orders

18 U.S.C. § 2265(c) withholds full faith and credit from an order against a petitioner unless a cross-petition was filed and the court made specific findings that each party was entitled to an order. Section 2265(b) requires notice and a hearing within a reasonable time after an ex parte order. Iowa Code § 236.20 bars mutual orders unless both parties petition. These rules were written to stop reflexive mutual orders. They are also a candor and findings rule Iowa could extend to the one-party ex parte case.

One principle

Micallef v Malta holds that a fair hearing applies to interim measures that effectively determine a civil right, however short. Doehr holds that a one-sided affidavit about a fight cannot be tested ex parte when exigency is missing. DK v Crowley struck an interim barring order with no short fixed period. Baril upheld Manitoba's regime because the evidence was sworn, a prima facie case was required, the order was unenforceable until notice, and review with cross-examination followed. The English practice guidance of January 18, 2017 says a without-notice order must never be made without a time limit, that the return day should normally be no more than 14 days, and that the order must recite that only the applicant's evidence was heard. Kurt v Austria requires preventive measures to be adequate and proportionate to the risk actually assessed.

Against that list, Iowa's chapter 236 meets the hearing date and, at the final-order stage, a real assault predicate. Chapter 664A meets neither a fixed short life nor a hearing on the order. Neither chapter has a candor duty or a respondent-side remedy. The § 236.4 "good cause" ex parte standard, satisfied by the petitioner's assertion of present danger, is the one-sided affidavit Doehr rejected.

Stary, final since the June 13, 2025 mandate, shows that duration and severity can move a standard of proof when an order functions like a permanent deprivation. Whether Iowa's repeat extensions and five-year criminal orders present that case is open. It is a litigation question for a parent-child order of that severity. It is a legislation question for everyone else, and the bill is on the cheapest-lever page.