Certain costs, thin proof of benefit
The statute harms people on a schedule. The safety claim has no Iowa schedule at all.
These are consequences written into the code or affirmed in opinions. They attach before anyone publishes a number showing the order stopped a later assault.
Seven days, consecutive, no suspension
Iowa Code § 664A.7 makes violation of a criminal no-contact order punishable as contempt, and for a listed offense the jail term is a minimum of seven consecutive days. The court cannot defer it, suspend it, or replace it with a fine. A fine can be added on top. § 664A.6 requires arrest when an officer has probable cause of a violation.
The contact that triggers this can be thin. New Jersey's Labinski (unpublished, 2024) sustained contempt for one unanswered call two days after a temporary order, over pocket-dial and voice-assistant theories. The order forbade contact, not only a successful conversation. No appellate decision located for this project reversed a violation for a pocket-dial, a Bluetooth auto-connection, or a third-party relay. Iowa's Milbrath (Court of Appeals, April 15, 2026) left a disbelieved stolen-phone defense in place because certiorari review does not reweigh the evidence. Willfulness is real at the hearing under Ary. It is a weak safety net on appeal.
Home, guns, and five years without reasons
A chapter 236 temporary order can give exclusive possession of a home before the hearing, on a showing of present danger in an ex parte proceeding. Doehr is the constitutional template for that fact pattern: a one-sided story about a fight, a home interest, no bond, and a later lawsuit that does not give the house back for the days it was lost. Iowa has not held § 236.4 unconstitutional. King affirmed home possession and firearm surrender in a final order.
After a qualifying conviction, plea, or deferred judgment, § 664A.5 allows a no-contact order for five years. State v. Hall (Iowa, May 22, 2026, unanimous) holds that the sentencing court "is not required to consider additional proof, make additional findings, or offer additional explanations," and that notice plus the sentencing hearing satisfies due process. Only the Legislature can add a findings requirement now. Rahimi upheld disarmament that is temporary and follows a judicial credible-threat finding with notice and a hearing. A five-year order with no stated reasons is the fact pattern Rahimi did not bless.
The filing itself becomes "history"
The research memo flags Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(j): commencement of a chapter 236 action counts toward a history of domestic abuse in custody. The memo marks the current numbering unconfirmed. If that cross-reference is still in the code, a petition that is later dismissed, or that expires and then cannot be appealed, has already been written into the custody factors. O'Brien v. Young (December 17, 2025) then dismisses the expired-order appeal as moot and calls relationship and mental-health harm conjecture. The disability can outlive the only proceeding that could test it.
That is the Iowa rule, not a split. Flores v. Aragon Nunez (same day), McGuire v. McGuire (2024), Henson v. Fitzgerald (2022), and R.M. v. D.S. (2023) dismissed expired-order appeals the same way, and no presumption of collateral consequences attaches to a chapter 236 order (O'Brien n.1). T.F. v. C.G. (February 2025) is the exception: it reached the merits "in an abundance of caution" while calling expired-order dismissals "a recurring problem." Ohio's Cyran majority is the adverse authority: legal collateral consequences must be imposed as a matter of law, and a presumption of non-mootness is a job for the legislature. That is why the cheapest mootness fix is a statute, not another brief.
Winning the case does not pay for the case
Runyan vacated the order and still denied the respondent's appellate fees. Chapter 236's fee provision runs against the defendant. Charles v. Charles (Appellate Court of Maryland, May 30, 2025) is the remedy warning from outside Iowa: a temporary order was used to take the marital home on the day the husband filed for limited divorce (he filed that morning, she petitioned that evening), the case was dismissed once a custody agreement delivered the house, the husband's abuse-of-process suit failed, and he was assessed $12,693 for bringing it. A commissioner's and a judge's "reasonable grounds" findings were treated as probable cause as a matter of law.
Iowa's verified counterexample of a false petition is State v. Vileta: perjury convictions on fabricated emails. That is a prosecution, not a system. There is no Iowa rule that a material omission on an ex parte petition dissolves the order and shifts fees. England has that rule. Iowa has the prosecution, rarely used.
The protected person can be held in contempt too
Henley (Iowa 1995) held the protected party in contempt, seven days suspended, for aiding and abetting the defendant's violation of the order protecting her, following Hutcheson (Iowa 1992): "the victim's permission and participation is no defense." Ohio, Washington, Indiana, and Kansas reject that. The chapter 236 petition form warns the petitioner she can be arrested if she initiates contact. Invitation is still not a defense for the respondent. Iowa is the outlier that exposes both people, and still leaves the respondent with the seven-day minimum.
Temporary orders are the instrument with the harm signal
Holt, Kernic, Wolf, and Rivara, JAMA 2002, followed 2,691 Seattle women after a police-reported incident. Women with temporary orders were more likely to have police-reported psychological abuse than women with no order: relative risk 4.0 in the first six months and 4.9 over twelve months (95% interval 2.8–8.6). Women with permanent orders were less likely to have police-reported physical violence over twelve months: relative risk 0.2 (95% interval 0.1–0.8). The authors warn that women who finish the process differ from women who do not. The split is still the only clean public evidence that the temporary instrument and the permanent instrument are not the same policy.
Iowa's criminal order is entered at the first appearance, before that permanent-order hearing exists. It is the temporary instrument, with a jail term attached.